During the last few years at school we were divided up into two streams-the language stream and the science and mathematics stream. We distinguished between the 'linguists' and the 'mathematicians' and they looked down on each other. The mathematicians accused the linguists of not being able to think logically, and the linguists regarded the mathematicians as cultural morons. I was a linguist, but I also liked science and mathematics, so I did not feel at ease with the distinction.
Then, when I became a doctor I noticed that many of my colleagues behaved much as my schoolmates had done. The scientifically minded ones, who were in the majority, said that everything must be measured: if something could not be measured, it must be made measurable. There was only one scientific method, that of the natural scientist, and it should be used to solve all medical problems. But they were opposed by the 'humanists' who accused the 'scientists' of treating their patients as objects and of forgetting that they were suffering human beings.
Forty years ago C P Snowl pointed out the lack of understanding between academics belonging to what he called the two cultures-the culture of science and the culture of the humanities. This is particularly unfortunate in medicine, which is at the same time a scientific and a humanistic discipline.
What then is the relationship between these two domains, that of science and that of the humanities? The question has interested philosophers representing very different schools of thought, and I shall mention a few of them.
In his early work2 the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas held that man had certain 'interests of knowledge' (Erkenntnisinteressen), and by that he meant the basic orientations of all human activities. One is the technical interest of man. Man must control nature in order to survive. He must find something to eat, he must learn to hunt and to distinguish between poisonous and edible berries, and he must also make clothes and find shelter to protect himself against the cold. These were the simple scientific questions that faced stone age man, and, although we have progressed a lot since then, it is this orientation which underlies the continuous development of science and technology. It is the motive force that led to the development of modern scientific medicine and our interest in anatomy, physiology, pharmacology and all the other scientific medical disciplines. This is why we are so interested in gathering objective facts.
Man, however, is also a social animal and in order to survive we must also be able to communicate with each another. We must be able to understand and interpret what other people say and how other people act. Interpretation is called hermeneutike in Greek, and Habermas labelled this interest or orientation the hermeneutic interest. He points out that this interest has both a horizontal and a vertical dimension. We must understand each other here and now, but we must also learn from previous generations. The hermeneutic interest is the motive force behind all the activities that take place in those university departments which deal with the humanities. Habermas also described a third interest of man, the emancipatory one, which is an essential part of his neo-marxist philosophy but need not concern us here. Karl Popper's approach was a very different one. He did not discuss the interests of man, but pointed out that the natural sciences and the humanities referred to different worlds3. First, there is Popper's 'world one', the objective world, and that is what we usually mean when we talk about the world. It is the world of all those phenomena of nature which we can observe mountains, houses, elephants, bacteria, stars. Human beings are likewise phenomena of nature, and in that sense they too belong to 'world one'.
'World one' is the playground of natural scientists. To use Habermas' expression, it is where they pursue their technical interest. They study the movements of the planets, the composition of chemical substances, and the structure and function of the human organism in health and disease. The scientists among doctors, concerning themselves with objective facts, are responsible for the progress of modern medicine. They have generated the knowledge we use to cure our patients.
Then there is 'world two', the subjective world, which comprises our thoughts, our memories and our feelings. Each of us, so to speak, constitutes a small subjective world. The feeling of illness, suffering, unpleasant symptoms of whatever kind, and fears for the future are 'world two' phenomena; and that, when you think about it, is what JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE Volume 92 November 1 999 medicine is really about. Medical science is linked to 'world one', but the aim of medicine is in 'world two'.
Popper also realized, however, that there is a 'world three' distinct from the other two. It is the world of those cultural products which are created by successive generations of mankind. Language and what is communicated by language are good examples. We cannot name those who created the Danish language, but it was created and it exists in an almost objective sense. However, the meaning of a text written in Danish is not a 'world one' phenomenon. One cannot observe the meaning of a text as one observes phenomena of nature. Nor is it necessarily part of anybody's 'world two'. The text may be found on the pages of a book that is stored away on the shelves of some obscure library, but it still exists. The ancient Egyptian language also existed during all those years when nobody could read the hieroglyphics.
'World three' of cultural products created by man contains many other things, such as works of art and scientific theories; and, also important in this context, it contains systems of moral norms and values. Each culture has its own unwritten moral code, telling people how to deal with each other. As Habermas pointed out, the human race could not survive if human beings did not communicate and interact with one another, and communication and interaction require 'world three' products such as a language, a set of values and a code of behaviour. Medical ethics as well as ethics in general belong to 'world three'.
So, perhaps this paper should have been entitled the three worlds, and not the two cultures, of medicine, but I preferred the latter title. Natural scientists deal with the objective facts of 'world one' but both the subjectivity of the individual patient and the values entering medical decisions are primarily the concern of the humanist.
CLINICAL PRACTICE
These ideas are relevant both to everyday clinical practice and to medical research. First, let us consider clinical practice, or to be more specific, let us imagine a doctor who is trying to decide which treatment to give to a particular patient. Such a decision is usually the net result of several very different ways of reasoning (Box 1)4. First, the doctor regards the patient, in bed or sitting in front of him, as an object, as a biological organism, as a phenomenon of nature to be observed. He knows a lot about the structure and function of the human organism, about disease mechanisms and about the mechanism of action of different drugs, and from that knowledge he may try to deduce what effect different treatments will have. This is reasoning from theoretical knowledge.
Box 1 The four components of clinical reasoning
But this is not the only type of scientific reasoning. Nowadays we have learnt to appreciate that the human organism is so complex and our knowledge always so limited that, usually, deductions from theoretical knowledge are not to be trusted, and therefore we prefer to base our decision on empirical evidence from the treatment of groups of patients resembling our patient. This is the idea of evidence-based medicine. Theoretical deductions are unreliable, so it is necessary to do randomized clinical trials and meta-analyses.
Either way, the doctor, acting as a natural scientist, concerns himself with objective facts and regards the patient as a 'world one' object, but we should remember that scientific reasoning is also heavily dependent on 'world three'. Popper has taught us that there is no such thing as a theory-free observation, and the theoretical framework within which the clinician makes and interprets his observations at the bedside belongs to 'world three', the world of cultural products.
Let us turn then to those aspects of clinical reasoning which, for want of a better word, I shall call humanistic. The patient's illness is not just a fault in the workings of his biological making. Rather, it is the way in which the patient interprets the effects of that fault, his subjective symptoms, in the context of his personal life experience and his ideas about life. Therefore, the clinician should not just record the patient's symptoms but must try to understand the patient's own interpretation of what is happening. This is the hermeneutic element of the clinical decision process.
The clinician should ask, 'What is it really like to be that patient?', and we may wonder to what extent this question can ever be answered. Subjective feelings are always personal, as we cannot enter somebody else's 'world two'. I cannot feel your toothache and you cannot feel mine.
Here, science is of no avail, and that fact is well illustrated by an essay by the American philosopher Thomas Nagel5 entitled 'What is it like to be a bat?'. It may sound a silly question, but I rather like the idea. Wouldn't it be fun experiencing being a bat? I would like to try flying around sharp corners in a dark cave guided by my sophisticated ultrasonic sense. But of course I shall never be given that opportunity. Perhaps,
* Scientific components
Reasoning from theoretical knowledge Reasoning from past experience * Humanistic components Hermeneutic reasoning (reasoning from understanding of the patient) Ethical reasoning one day, scientists will think that they have explained everything about the workings of this ultrasonic sense, but even so they will never learn what it feels like being a bat from the bat's subjective point of view. Only a bat will know the answer. Happily, understanding a patient is not as impossible as understanding a bat. The clinician and the patient belong to the same species and they communicate by language. Two people, if they make the effort and keep an open mind, should be able to understand each other, especially if they have the same cultural background. A doctor seeing a patient must make this effort.
Nagel's essay, however, is still relevant from a medical point of view, since it illustrates the difference between the subjective viewpoint (of the bat or the patient) and the objective viewpoint of the scientist, which Nagel also calls 'the view from nowhere'6. Scientific reasoning does not permit us to enter somebody else's personal 'world two'. Kierkegaard made the same point 150 years ago when he noted that 'the way of objective reflection makes the subject accidental, and thereby transforms existence into something indifferent, something vanishing'7.
The humanistic aspect of clinical decision-making also includes ethical reasoning i.e. reasoning about values and norms-and the most important judgments about values are of course those which concern the goodness of life. It has become very fashionable to talk about our patients' quality of life, but what do we understand by this expression? People living together to a large extent share the same values, but even those who have the same cultural background may offer different answers.
Some will say that a good life is just a question of accumulating as much happiness as possible throughout life. That is what the old utilitarians thought, and what some misguided colleagues seem to believe when they concern themselves with quality-adjusted life years.
Then there are those who say that your life is good only if you yourself are in control of it. You must decide for yourself, and that is considered good in itself, whatever the consequences. This is an important consideration in our culture, and it is associated with the idea that we should respect each other's right to self-determination. Others say that life is good if you are true to your nature and fulfil yourself. This is what people mean when they say that they wish to 'find themselves' and to live life accordingly.
As a fourth option, there are those who think very differently. They say that, when you lie on your deathbed, you should not just remember all your happy moments and consider whether you were in control of your life. You should also ask 'What was my life worth?'. This is different because now we require an external standard or benchmark for a good life. Now we are asking, 'What did I do for other people, what did I create?'.
All these answers are probably to some extent valid, and they serve to prove that quality of life is a multidimensional concept.
Clinicians, of course, are also faced with numerous specific ethical questions which I shall not discuss-about autonomy and paternalism, about euthanasia and abortion, about telling the truth to cancer patients, about the dilemmas of organ transplantation. The answers to many of these are in the last resort linked to our ideas about a good life.
In short, this is what is so fascinating about clinical practice. The clinician must be a good scientist, but he must also be a compassionate humanist, and whenever he makes a decision he must try to reach a synthesis of these very different ways of reasoning.
MEDICAL RESEARCH
At the beginning I mentioned the childish squabbles at school between linguists and mathematicians, and I also mentioned that the scientists and humanists among doctors sometimes behave in much the same manner. This is particularly true of doctors actively engaged in medical research; and in those circles such behaviour is particularly futile since researchers, unlike clinicians, need not aspire to reach a synthesis of different types of reasoning. They should just respect each other, realizing that there is a need for different types of medical research.
Scientifically minded doctors may do laboratory research and generate important new knowledge about, for instance, causes and mechanisms of disease, or they may do randomized clinical trials to acquire knowledge that is directly applicable at the bedside. The need for this kind of research cannot be questioned.
The humanists among doctors, on the other hand, may do qualitative research, using the methods that have been developed by anthropologists and sociologists. There are many important questions which can only be explored, if not answered, by such studies. What is it like to have an ileostomy, to be told that one has an incurable cancer, to be admitted to hospital as an emergency patient with severe precordial pain, and so on?
Since the importance of this kind of research is not so well appreciated, I shall give a single example8. The study was done by a nurse. She had interviewed patients with chronic renal disease, listening to their complaints, their worries, their hopes. We hear about patients who did not like home dialysis, because they worried about all those tubes and technical devices in their homes, and we hear about those who were pleased to give up hospital dialysis because having to spend so much time in hospital made them feel more ill. We also hear about the patients' hopes as they are waiting for a suitable donor and about their depression when rejection sets in. No quality of life index can possibly provide information about such matters. Apart from the scientists doing scientific research and the humanists doing qualitative research, we need ethicists who try to analyse complex moral dilemmas, and perhaps medical philosophers who try to analyse the very framework of medical thinking. But the different kinds of researchers must always critically consider the relevance of their methods. The scientists may use rating scales and visual analogue scales to measure pain (not the pain as such but what patients say about their pain), and they may even invent scoring systems quantifying types of handicaps; but when they talk about measuring quality of life they have gone too far. The humanists among researchers, on the other hand, must not suppose that long carefully analysed interviews of a small sample of patients can ever replace the evidence from large and randomized trials.
Will it ever be possible to unite the two cultures? I do not know the answer. The distinction between science and the humanities, between the objective and the subjective viewpoint, in the last resort reflects the distinction between body and mind, so it will not be resolved until we find an answer to the philosophical body-mind problem. Both in medicine and in our daily lives we can do no more than realize that it is the predicament of man to face the objective realities of this world and to communicate with our fellow human beings.
